上月，美國防長馬蒂斯在香格里拉對話會上以美國政府的名義全面闡述了美國“印太戰(zhàn)略”。特朗普總統(tǒng)入主白宮后，政府高層先是鼓吹以“印太”取代“亞太”，提出“一個自由與開放”的“印太愿景”，繼而發(fā)表《國家安全戰(zhàn)略》闡述當(dāng)前印太地區(qū)不同“世界秩序之間的地緣競爭”。如今，馬蒂斯的演講標(biāo)志著美國“印太戰(zhàn)略”正式落地。

At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June, Secretary of Defense James Mattis explained the United States' Indo-Pacific strategy, evolving from the desire for “a free and open Indo-Pacific” and the reality of “geopolitical competition” between two types of world order.

美國“印太戰(zhàn)略”包涵四個方面內(nèi)容：加大海上安全；強化與盟友和伙伴國的軍事合作；加強法治、公民社會和透明治理；提倡市場引領(lǐng)的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展。美國推行“印太戰(zhàn)略”的目標(biāo)，是要在該地區(qū)采取政治、經(jīng)濟、軍事等綜合手段，遏制中國的崛起，削弱中國影響力，以鞏固美國的霸主地位。從根本上來說，美國“印太戰(zhàn)略”與“亞太再平衡”一脈相承，前者是后者的延續(xù)和升級，企圖在更大的范圍內(nèi)遏制和堵截中國發(fā)展的勢頭。

The Indo-Pacific strategy contains four elements: Strengthening maritime security; enhancing military cooperation with allies and partners; underscoring the rule of law, civil society, and transparent governance; and advocating for development of a market-led economy. The ultimate goal of US Indo-Pacific strategy is, through joint applications of political, economic and military means, to contain China's rise and undermine China's influence so as to consolidate the US' dominant position in the region. In essence, the Indo-Pacific strategy is the continuation and upgrade of the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, a policy which was devised to contain China's development.

人們不禁要問美國“印太戰(zhàn)略”能走多遠，是否會達到預(yù)定的目標(biāo)？仔細審視美國的“印太戰(zhàn)略”不難發(fā)現(xiàn)，設(shè)想很美好，但現(xiàn)實很無情，前行的路上障礙重重。

It's natural for people to ask: Could the US Indo-Pacific strategy succeed? After a close examination of the strategy, it would be natural to say: It's easier said than done, and there are numerous obstacles ahead.

首先，核心隊伍心不齊。在美國“印太戰(zhàn)略”的四個核心國家中，日、澳、印與美不是一條心，各有各的利益訴求，很難擰成一股繩，實現(xiàn)美國遏華抑華的目標(biāo)。

First, each of the four core members of the Indo-Pacific strategy, namely, the US, Japan, Australia, and India, have different priorities in the region. So it's impossible for them to be devoted wholeheartedly to the US' strategy to contain China.

日本“印太戰(zhàn)略”側(cè)重于經(jīng)濟合作，意在通過自由貿(mào)易、基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)和發(fā)展，促進亞洲、中東和非洲的互聯(lián)互通，強調(diào)“基于規(guī)則的秩序”和“對國際法的尊重”。此外，還包括配合美國，對朝鮮半島事務(wù)和中國南海問題施加影響與干涉。針對中國的一面不言而喻。然而，由于美國政府推行“美國優(yōu)先”，美日關(guān)系出現(xiàn)齟齬。今年初日本調(diào)整其“逢中必反”的對華政策，提出要將其“印太戰(zhàn)略”與中國主導(dǎo)的“一帶一路”倡議聯(lián)系起來并加以推進，使其成為中日兩國新的合作基石。

For Japan, its priorities are to underscore economic cooperation, to promote the connectivity of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa through free trade and infrastructure construction, and to a highlight rule-based order and respect for international law. Together with the US, it also wants to influence and interfere in the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea. It's pretty obvious that the Japanese also want to contain China. After the Trump administration implemented the “America First” policy, however, discord in US-Japan relations began to grow. At the beginning of this year, Japan moderated its anti-China policies and proposed promoting the Indo-Pacific strategy along with China's Belt and Road Initiative as the new foundation for China-Japan cooperation.

澳大利亞位于印度洋和太平洋兩大洋之間，從吉拉德以來歷屆澳政府都認(rèn)同“印太”概念，并將其上升到戰(zhàn)略高度的層面，寫入從2013年以來的所有國防和外交白皮書中。從一定意義上說，澳大利亞外交政策就是澳方的“印太戰(zhàn)略”，它帶有強烈的兩面性：一面“致力于同中國發(fā)展強大和建設(shè)性的關(guān)系”，一面又渲染中國崛起帶來的挑戰(zhàn)，呼吁美國維持在印太地區(qū)的存在。在中美之間搞平衡是澳大利亞外交的最大公約數(shù)。對于美國“印太戰(zhàn)略”，澳方的做法是在擁抱的同時，又強調(diào)“解決全球性挑戰(zhàn)離不開中國作用”。搞壞對華關(guān)系并不符合澳大利亞的根本利益，澳方配合美國“印太戰(zhàn)略”的行動空間有限。

Australia, saddled between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, has recognized the Indo-Pacific idea ever since the Julia Gillard government (from 2010 to 2013). The concept was even elevated to a national strategy, and has been referred to in its white papers on national defense and diplomacy since 2013. To some extent, the Australian foreign policy was guided by its own version of the Indo-Pacific strategy. For Australia, this is a two-sided strategy. On the one hand, it calls for strong and constructive relations with China, but on the other hand, it claims that China's rise poses challenges and calls on the US to maintain a presence in the Indo-Pacific region. Australia's diplomatic goal is to seek a balance in relations with both China and the US. As for the US version of the Indo-Pacific strategy, Australia, while showing its support, has also stressed China's role in solving global challenges and problems. Any move that might damage relations with China would not conform to the fundamental interests of Australia; therefore, room for Australia to adopt the US Indo-Pacific strategy is limited.

印度總理莫迪在香格里拉對話會發(fā)表主旨演講，強調(diào)“印太”是一個地理概念而不是一個戰(zhàn)略概念。他說，“印度不把印太地區(qū)視為一個戰(zhàn)略、一個排他性的俱樂部或者一個尋求主導(dǎo)權(quán)的集團。我們也絕不會認(rèn)為它是針對任何一個國家的?！憋@然，莫迪講話與美國“印太戰(zhàn)略”并不合拍。印度不可能被美國收編，成為其馬前卒，印度仍將繼續(xù)維護其“戰(zhàn)略自主”政策，游走于大國之間，從各方得到好處。以習(xí)近平主席與莫迪武漢會晤為標(biāo)志，印度政府調(diào)整了前一階段與中國對抗的做法，兩國關(guān)系重新走上合作友好的道路。

In his keynote speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stressed that the Indo-Pacific is more of a geographical concept than a strategic one. He said, “India does not see the Indo-Pacific Region as a strategy or as a club of limited members. Nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate. And by no means do we consider it as directed against any country.” It was obvious that Modi's speech did not toe the line of the US Indo-Pacific strategy. India did not want to be the US' pawn and wanted to maintain its “strategic independent” policy so that it could maneuver among the big powers and maximize its interests. After his watershed meeting with President Xi Jinping in Wuhan, Modi adjusted its previous confrontational policy towards China and the two nations returned to the road of friendship and cooperation.

此外，美國推行“印太戰(zhàn)略”缺少抓手。盡管馬蒂斯講話中屢屢提及南海軍事化，但是南海爭端聲索國家對此集體失聲。奧巴馬政府推行亞太再平衡，以南海爭端為抓手，挑撥離間，導(dǎo)致地區(qū)緊張局勢高燒不退。而現(xiàn)如今，南海地區(qū)形勢已明顯降溫趨穩(wěn)，并呈現(xiàn)積極發(fā)展的態(tài)勢，有關(guān)各方回歸通過談判磋商解決爭議的正軌。美國積極拉攏越南、菲律賓、印度尼西亞參與“印太戰(zhàn)略”，但應(yīng)者了了。有意思的是，美日澳印都強調(diào)要發(fā)揮東盟的中心作用，但東盟對美國“印太戰(zhàn)略”卻三緘其口，關(guān)鍵原因是特朗普政府公信力和領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力下降，有關(guān)各方意見不一，對美國“印太戰(zhàn)略”很難形成一致看法。

Furthermore, the US does not have convincing reasons to pursue its Indo-Pacific strategy. Mattis repeatedly mentioned the militarization of the South China Sea islands in his speech as a reason for the need to contain China, even as all countries with claims in the South China Sea remained silent about it. When the Obama administration started to pursue the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, it also used the South China Sea as an excuse to sow discord and raise regional tensions. Now, it's completely different. Tensions relating to the South China Sea have been eased, calm has returned to the region, a trend of positive development has emerged, and all parties concerned have returned to the correct track of settling disputes: through consultation and negotiation. The US attempted to rope Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia into its Indo-Pacific strategy, but few responded positively. Interestingly, the US, Japan, Australia, and India all stressed that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations play the central role in effectuating the Indo-Pacific strategy, but ASEAN has never actively supported it. The main reason behind this is the waning creditability and leadership of the Trump administration.

更重要的是，“美國優(yōu)先”增加了美“印太戰(zhàn)略”實行的不確定性。特朗普執(zhí)政的主基調(diào)是，在“美國優(yōu)先”原則下，聚焦美國遭受不公正待遇，被別國占了便宜，要大幅度提升盟國軍費份額；不分親疏征收高額關(guān)稅；就伊核問題和采購俄制武器實施“二級制裁”等?！懊绹鴥?yōu)先”不但令世界很受傷，也讓印太盟國和伙伴國憂心忡忡。這從根本上攪亂了美國“印太戰(zhàn)略”部署，使其陷入了起步難的困境。

Lastly, the Trump administration's “America First” policy has added uncertainty to the United States' application of its Indo-Pacific strategy. It believes that the US has been treated unfairly and ripped off by other nations. Under the “America First” principle, therefore, the Trump administration aims to ensure that defense spending is be shared by its allies; to impose extra tariffs on all, including its allies; and to impose “secondary sanctions” relating to the Iran nuclear issue and the purchase of Russian weapons. The “America First” policy not only harms the world, but also makes its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region concerned and worried. This would fundamentally disrupt the US plan for the implementation of the Indo-Pacific strategy, and make the debut of the strategy difficult.

綜上所述，美國“印太戰(zhàn)略”前景暗淡，改變不了印太地區(qū)和平與發(fā)展的大勢，但對于美國在本地區(qū)擴軍備戰(zhàn)，必須保持警惕并有所準(zhǔn)備。

In a word, the future of the Indo-Pacific strategy is dim, and it will not be able to successfully disrupt peace and development in the Indo-Pacific region. However, all should be on alert and be prepared for any arms race instigated by the US in the region.

作者：吳正龍，中國國際問題研究基金會高級研究員

（來源：中美聚焦網(wǎng)，編輯：Helen）