自從唐納德·特朗普當(dāng)選美國(guó)總統(tǒng)以來，專家們一直在猜測(cè)，這是否會(huì)導(dǎo)致中國(guó)與歐盟的關(guān)系更加密切。最近已經(jīng)有許多跡象顯示出了這種傾向，雖說歐盟和中國(guó)之間以往也存在著分歧。歐盟發(fā)現(xiàn)自己正處在中國(guó)和美國(guó)之間，這也許能讓它加強(qiáng)自身在國(guó)際秩序中的作用。

Since Donald Trump was elected US president, pundits have been speculating whether this would lead to a closer relationship between China and the EU. Many signs have recently pointed in that direction, despite the fact that in the past, the EU and China have also had their share of differences. The EU thus finds itself in a middle position between the US and China, which could allow it to strengthen its role in the international order.

總體上，歐中關(guān)系在實(shí)際工作層面一直比較牢固。但政見使具體的分歧變得突出，特別是貿(mào)易關(guān)系相當(dāng)棘手。最近一個(gè)例子是對(duì)中國(guó)市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)地位（MES）的爭(zhēng)議，這一爭(zhēng)議已經(jīng)對(duì)其他領(lǐng)域產(chǎn)生溢出效應(yīng)。

Overall, EU-China relations have long been strong on a pragmatic and working level. Politics have highlighted specific differences, particularly in trade relations, that may prove difficult to resolve. One recent example is the debate over China's Market Economy Status (MES), which has had spill over effects into other areas.

2016年，中國(guó)加入WTO議定書的一項(xiàng)條款到期，該條款認(rèn)定中國(guó)為非市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)。北京方面認(rèn)為，條款到期意味著中國(guó)將自動(dòng)獲得MES，而這會(huì)使歐盟等貿(mào)易伙伴對(duì)中國(guó)產(chǎn)品采取反傾銷措施的能力發(fā)生改變。美國(guó)和歐盟都未明確給予中國(guó)MES，認(rèn)為中國(guó)沒有達(dá)到標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。然而，獲得MES一直是中國(guó)主要的外交目標(biāo)之一，中國(guó)也一直不加掩飾地為獲得MES向合作伙伴施壓。例如，由于歐盟在MES問題上的立場(chǎng)，2017年中歐布魯塞爾峰會(huì)之后有關(guān)氣候變化和清潔能源的聯(lián)合聲明就被扣下了。

In 2016, a provision in China's WTO Accession protocol expired, which identified China as a non-market economy. Beijing argued that this meant China would automatically be granted MES, which would change the abilities of trading partners such as the EU to launch anti-dumping measures against Chinese products. Neither the US nor the EU have explicitly granted China MES, arguing China does not fulfil the criteria. Yet, attaining this status has been one of China's key diplomatic goals and it has not shied away from putting pressure on its partners to get it. For instance, in 2017, a joint statement on climate change and clean energy was withheld after the EU-China Summit in Brussels due to the EU's position on MES.

不過，目前確實(shí)存在著關(guān)系改善的跡象。

Signs of improved relations do, however, exist.

貿(mào)易和投資仍然是中歐關(guān)系的支柱，而在看上去雙方擁有更多共識(shí)的問題上，如氣候變化、維護(hù)伊朗核協(xié)議、啟動(dòng)WTO改革等，中歐合作是穩(wěn)固的。中國(guó)在歐盟的投資越來越多，由于監(jiān)管障礙較少，政策環(huán)境可預(yù)測(cè)，以及擁有高技術(shù)資產(chǎn)，中國(guó)目前對(duì)歐洲的投資比對(duì)北美高九倍。中歐雙邊投資協(xié)定談判正在進(jìn)行中，考慮到當(dāng)前國(guó)際貿(mào)易和投資關(guān)系面臨的種種坎坷，談判本身就可以說是一個(gè)積極的跡象。

Trade and investment remain the backbone of EU-China relations, and cooperation is strong on issues where there seems to be more of a common understanding, such as on climate change, the preservation of the Iran nuclear deal, and initiating WTO reform. China is increasingly investing in the EU, with investment volumes now nine-times higher in Europe than in North America due to fewer regulatory hurdles, a predictable policy environment, and high-tech assets. Negotiations over a Bilateral Investment Agreement between the two are moving along, which can itself be seen as a positive sign when taking into account all the stumbling blocks currently facing international trade and investment relations.

今年7月的中歐峰會(huì)受到稱贊，因?yàn)檫@是兩年來雙方第一次發(fā)表聯(lián)合聲明，表明雙方都愿意積極描述它們之間的關(guān)系。但仔細(xì)研讀這份聲明會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)，雙方的共識(shí)似乎只存在于一些比較模糊的問題上，而人權(quán)、鋼鐵產(chǎn)能過剩、南海等更為敏感的問題并不包括在內(nèi)。幾個(gè)曾經(jīng)引發(fā)激烈爭(zhēng)議的話題，如MES、鋼鐵關(guān)稅或貿(mào)易保護(hù)立法，都沒有被提及。

July's EU-China Summit was applauded for producing the first joint statement in two years, which illustrates that both sides aim to project a positive picture of their relations. But on taking a closer look at the statement, consensus between both parties seems to exist on rather vague issues, while more sensitive issues such as human rights, steel overcapacity, and the South China Sea were not included. No mention has been made of several contentious topics that have produced heated debate such as MES, steel tariffs, or trade defence legislation.

自從特朗普對(duì)中國(guó)商品加征關(guān)稅以來，北京加大了對(duì)歐盟的魅力攻勢(shì)。雖然以往中國(guó)更愿意與個(gè)別成員國(guó)打交道，但它目前認(rèn)為，把歐盟當(dāng)成單一行為體來對(duì)待更加有利，尤其是在建立反美聯(lián)盟的時(shí)候。

Since Trump increased tariffs on Chinese goods, Beijing has upped its charm-offensive towards the EU. While in the past China has preferred to deal with individual member states, it now sees advantages in dealing with the EU as a single actor, in particular when it comes to building alliances against the US

與此同時(shí)，北京繼續(xù)與單個(gè)歐盟成員國(guó)打交道。過去十年，在經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系不斷深化的同時(shí)，中方似乎越來越不愿意深度卷入人權(quán)等敏感問題。而通過默默的外交活動(dòng)，德國(guó)說服中國(guó)準(zhǔn)許已故諾貝爾獎(jiǎng)得主劉曉波的妻子劉霞離開中國(guó)前往德國(guó)。

At the same time, Beijing continues to deal with individual EU Member States as well. Over the past decade, the deepening of economic ties seems to have been accompanied by an increasing unwillingness on the part of China to engage substantially on sensitive issues like human rights. Yet, through quiet diplomacy, Germany managed to persuade China to allow Liu Xia, wife of late Nobel Prize winner Liu Xiaobo, to leave China for Germany.

雖然這些都表明雙邊關(guān)系取得了進(jìn)展，但懷疑也是有道理的。中國(guó)在歐盟的存在和投資日益增加，引發(fā)了有關(guān)國(guó)家安全問題的爭(zhēng)論。德國(guó)等國(guó)已呼吁歐盟制定統(tǒng)一政策處理中國(guó)在敏感領(lǐng)域的投資。國(guó)家立法已經(jīng)收緊，一項(xiàng)全歐盟范圍內(nèi)的立法提案正在制定中，內(nèi)容包括加強(qiáng)成員國(guó)之間對(duì)可能涉及國(guó)家安全的投資的信息共享。這些舉措為歐盟與中國(guó)關(guān)系增添了爭(zhēng)議內(nèi)容，有可能引來反制措施，但它也表明歐盟為保護(hù)自身利益甘冒這一風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

While these are signs of progress in the relationship, scepticism is warranted. China's increasing presence and investments in the EU have sparked debate over national security issues. Countries like Germany have called for a common EU approach towards Chinese investments in sensitive areas. National legislation has been tightened and an EU-wide legislative proposal that includes increased information-sharing among Member States regarding investments with potential national security implications is currently in the making. Such initiatives add contentious elements to the EU-China relationship which could provoke countermeasures, but demonstrate that this is a risk the EU is willing to take to protect its own interests.

歐盟對(duì)中國(guó)主推的“一帶一路”以及中國(guó)與中東歐的“16 + 1”合作平臺(tái)等倡議也是心存疑慮。歐盟還批評(píng)中國(guó)限制歐洲企業(yè)進(jìn)入其市場(chǎng)、實(shí)行保護(hù)主義、缺乏互惠。歐盟領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人明確表示，盡管他們不打算站在中國(guó)一邊反對(duì)美國(guó)，但他們也覺得不能再把美國(guó)現(xiàn)政府當(dāng)成穩(wěn)定的合作伙伴來依靠。

The EU has also been sceptical of Chinese initiatives like the flagship Belt and Road Initiative and 16+1, China's platform to engage Central and Eastern European Countries. The EU also criticises the lack of market access for European businesses in the Chinese market, protectionism, and lack of reciprocity. EU leaders have made it clear that although they do not intend to side with China against the US yet, they also feel they can no longer rely on the current US administration as a stable partner.

歐盟委員會(huì)主席讓-克洛德·容克日前對(duì)美國(guó)的訪問被譽(yù)為獲得了成功，它展示出美歐的團(tuán)結(jié)友好，與月初加拿大G7峰會(huì)的可怕景象形成鮮明對(duì)比。但到目前為止，訪問唯一的實(shí)際成果就是雙方同意未來進(jìn)行談判。

EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker's recent visit to the US has been applauded as a success and produced pictures of unity and friendship that stand in contrast to viral images from the G7 Summit earlier this month in Canada. But the only tangible outcome so far is an agreement to future talks.

在當(dāng)前的辯論中，國(guó)際關(guān)系時(shí)常以過于簡(jiǎn)單化的方式呈現(xiàn)。雖然每天的轟動(dòng)性政治事件往往凸顯國(guó)際關(guān)系的劇烈變化，但官僚機(jī)構(gòu)的車輪卻保證了基本工作的運(yùn)行，而這通常在公眾的視線之外。通過這些流程，盡管特朗普加稅、反復(fù)威脅和口頭攻擊，歐美卻依然保持著密切的關(guān)系。類似機(jī)制同時(shí)也在推動(dòng)中歐關(guān)系在工作層面取得進(jìn)展，雖然雙方存在政治上的分歧。

In the current debate, international relations are often presented in an oversimplified way. While the daily stir of politics tends to highlight the drastic shifts in these relations, the wheels of bureaucracy ensure the continuance of the foundational work - often beyond public sight. Through these processes, EU-US relations will remain close despite Trump's tariffs, repeated threats and verbal attacks. But these same mechanisms simultaneously drive the progress of EU-China relations on a working level, despite political differences.

歐盟正面臨平衡對(duì)華、對(duì)美關(guān)系的挑戰(zhàn)，其內(nèi)部對(duì)外交政策也莫衷一是。如果歐盟不強(qiáng)烈表達(dá)自己的利益，中國(guó)和美國(guó)的決策者就可能更加認(rèn)為歐盟無足輕重。歐盟不太可能選擇一方，排斥另一方，因?yàn)樗趦蛇叾加兄卮罄妫疫@種排斥會(huì)破壞歐盟在多邊和以規(guī)則為基礎(chǔ)的國(guó)際秩序中發(fā)揮更大作用的目標(biāo)。與日本等其他大國(guó)加速達(dá)成貿(mào)易協(xié)議就表明，歐盟在有足夠政治意愿情況下是有行動(dòng)能力的，而這會(huì)加強(qiáng)歐盟在國(guó)際舞臺(tái)上的地位，并給其他合作伙伴發(fā)出信號(hào)。歐盟如果運(yùn)籌帷幄，就能找準(zhǔn)定位，在國(guó)際貿(mào)易中保持強(qiáng)勢(shì)，這樣就有可能與中國(guó)和美國(guó)這兩個(gè)歐盟最大貿(mào)易伙伴達(dá)成投資協(xié)議。不管怎樣，這種定位將為歐盟提供跳板，在充滿緊張的世界中實(shí)現(xiàn)自己的目標(biāo)。

The EU is facing the challenge of balancing its relations with China as well as the US while facing internal disputes on foreign policy. If the EU does not project its own interests strongly, Chinese and US decision makers may further doubt the Union's relevance. It is unlikely that the EU would choose one partner over the other as it has critical interests with both, and such exclusion would harm its aim to strengthen its role within a multilateral, rule-based international order. Accelerating trade deals with other large economies, like Japan, demonstrates that the EU is capable of acting when there is enough political will, which can strengthen its position in the international arena and send signals to other partners. If the EU plays its cards right, it could position itself well and maintain its strong credentials in international trade. This could yield investment agreements with China and the US, its two largest trading partners. Either way, such positioning would provide the EU with a springboard to pursue its goals in a world full of tension.

作者：因薩·埃韋特（Insa Ewert），德國(guó)全球與區(qū)域問題研究所研究員

（來源：中美聚焦網(wǎng)，編輯：Helen）