三、美國政府的貿(mào)易保護主義行為
III. The trade protectionist practices of the US administration

美國存在大量扭曲市場競爭、阻礙公平貿(mào)易、割裂全球產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈的投資貿(mào)易限制政策和行為，有損以規(guī)則為基礎的多邊貿(mào)易體制，并嚴重影響中美經(jīng)貿(mào)關系正常發(fā)展。
The numerous investment and trade restriction policies and actions adopted by the US that distort market competition, hamper fair trade, and lead to breakdowns in global industrial chains are detrimental to the rules-based multilateral trading system and severely affect the normal development of China-US economic and trade relations.

（一）歧視他國產(chǎn)品
1. Discrimination against foreign products

美國大量監(jiān)管政策違反公平競爭原則，歧視他國產(chǎn)品，具有明顯的利己主義和保護主義傾向。美國通過立法直接或間接限制購買其他國家產(chǎn)品，使他國企業(yè)在美遭受不公平待遇，中國企業(yè)是其中的主要受害者。
Many American regulatory policies are clearly self-serving and protectionist as they run counter to the principle of fair competition and discriminate against foreign products. The US directly or indirectly restricts the purchase of products from other countries through legislation, subjecting foreign companies to unfair treatment in the US, with Chinese companies being the main victims.

美國產(chǎn)品市場的公平競爭環(huán)境不如多數(shù)發(fā)達國家，甚至遜于一些發(fā)展中國家。根據(jù)經(jīng)合組織發(fā)布的2013年“產(chǎn)品市場監(jiān)管指標”（注30）對35個經(jīng)合組織國家進行排名，前3位是荷蘭、英國和澳大利亞。美國只排在第27位，反映出美國市場監(jiān)管政策對產(chǎn)品市場公平競爭存在較多障礙。而在加入12個非經(jīng)合組織國家的指標后，美國在47個國家中僅列第30位，其產(chǎn)品市場公平競爭環(huán)境不及立陶宛、保加利亞和馬耳他等非經(jīng)合組織國家。
The US product market falls behind most developed countries and even some developing countries in terms of fair competition. According to the statistics on Indicators of Product Market Regulation released by the OECD in 2013, the Netherlands, the UK and Australia were the top three among 35 OECD countries, while the US ranked only 27th, pointing to the many obstacles created by the US market regulatory policies for fair competition in the product market. When the indicators of 12 non-OECD countries were added, the US ranked only 30th among the 47 countries, indicating a product market environment less fair than those of non-OECD countries such as Lithuania, Bulgaria and Malta.

美國對他國產(chǎn)品的歧視程度遠高于大多數(shù)發(fā)達國家，甚至也高于一些發(fā)展中國家。根據(jù)“產(chǎn)品市場監(jiān)管指標”二級指標“國外供應商差別待遇”（注31）對35個經(jīng)合組織國家進行排名，2013年美國排在第32位，表明美國產(chǎn)品市場對外國存在嚴重歧視。若包括12個非經(jīng)合組織國家的指標，美國在47個國家中排名第39位，歧視程度比巴西、保加利亞、塞浦路斯、印度、印度尼西亞和羅馬尼亞等非經(jīng)合組織國家更高（注32）（圖7）。
The US is far more discriminatory against foreign products than most developed countries and even some developing countries. According to the ranking of 35 OECD countries on Differential Treatment of Foreign Suppliers , a secondary indicator of the Indicators of Product Market Regulation, the US ranked 32nd among 35 OECD countries in 2013, indicating severe discrimination against foreign countries in its product market. When the indicators of 12 non-OECD countries were added, the US ranked 39th among the 47 countries, with a higher degree of discrimination than such non-OECD countries as Brazil, Bulgaria, Cyprus, India, Indonesia and Romania (Chart 7).

美國通過立法嚴格要求政府部門采購本國產(chǎn)品，并對采購他國產(chǎn)品設置歧視性條款。例如，《購買美國產(chǎn)品法案》規(guī)定，美國聯(lián)邦政府機構僅能采購在美國生產(chǎn)的加工最終產(chǎn)品以及在美國開采或生產(chǎn)的未加工品（注33）。《美國法典》規(guī)定，針對申請聯(lián)邦政府或州政府資助的公共交通項目，必須使用美國國產(chǎn)的鐵、鋼和制成品（注34）。《農(nóng)業(yè)、農(nóng)村發(fā)展、食品和藥品管理及相關機構撥款法案》規(guī)定，撥款資金不得為學校午餐、兒童成人關照食品、兒童夏日食品服務、學校早餐等項目購買從中國進口的生的或加工過的家禽產(chǎn)品。（注35）《國防授權法案》以國家安全為由，規(guī)定禁止聯(lián)邦政府采購中國企業(yè)提供的通訊設備和服務（注36）。
The US, by way of legislation, sets strict requirements on its government departments to “buy American” and imposes discriminatory terms on purchasing foreign products. For example, the Buy American Act stipulates that US federal agencies can only acquire manufactured products made in America and unmanufactured articles that have been mined or produced in America. According to the Code of Laws of the United States of America, an application for a public transport project receiving federal or state funding can be granted only if the steel, iron and manufactured goods used in the project are produced in the US. According to the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, none of the funds made available by this Act may be used to procure raw or processed poultry products imported into the US from China for use in the school lunch program, the Child and Adult Care Food Program, the Summer Food Service Program for Children or the school breakfast program. The National Defense Authorization Act prohibits the federal government from procuring telecommunications equipment and services provided by Chinese companies on the grounds of national security.

（二）濫用“國家安全審查”，阻礙中國企業(yè)在美正常投資活動
2. Abuse of “National Security Review” as a way to obstruct the normal investment activities of Chinese companies in the US

美國是全球范圍內(nèi)最早對外國投資實施安全審查的國家。1975年，美國專門成立外國投資委員會，負責監(jiān)測外國投資對美國的影響。1988年，美國通過《埃克森－弗洛里奧修正案》，對《1950年國防生產(chǎn)法》進行了修正，授權美國總統(tǒng)及其指派者對外資并購進行審查?！?007年外商投資與國家安全法案》擴充了外國投資委員會（注37），擴大其安全審查范圍。從半個多世紀的立法過程看，美國對外國投資實施安全審查的主線就是收緊法規(guī)政策，擴大監(jiān)管隊伍和審查范圍，近期特別針對中國強化了審查和限制。
The US is the first in the world to conduct security reviews on foreign investment. In 1975, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) was established for the specific purpose of monitoring the impact of foreign investment in the US. In 1988, the Exon-Florio Amendment revised the 1950 Defense Production Act by mandating the US President and people with the authority to review foreign takeovers. The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 expanded CFIUS and broadened its scope of review. The legislation process in the US over the past 50 years shows that the US security review of foreign investment has mainly been characterized by tighter laws, regulations and policies, expanded regulatory teams and scope of reviews, and more recently, intensified screening and restrictions vis-à-vis China.

在外商投資安全審查實踐中，美國“國家安全審查”的依據(jù)模糊不清，審查力度不斷加大。根據(jù)美國外國投資委員會的歷年外資安全審查報告（注38），2005－2008年審查外國投資交易案例468起，其中需要進入調查階段的案例37起，占比僅8%。但自2008年美國財政部發(fā)布《外國人合并、收購和接管規(guī)制：最終規(guī)則》（注39）以后，2009－2015年期間審查的770起案例中，需要進入調查階段的達到310起，占比陡然提高到40%。尤其是在最新披露的2015年數(shù)據(jù)中，這一比例進一步提高到46%，處于較高水平（圖8）。
In practice, the US “national security review” is often based on flimsy evidence and is becoming increasingly stringent. According to CFIUS annual reports to Congress, the Committee reviewed 468 foreign investment transactions from 2005 to 2008, only 37 of which (8 percent) entered the stage of investigation. However, since the Department of the Treasury issued the Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons in 2008, among the 770 cases reviewed between 2009 and 2015, 310 cases – 40 percent of the total – passed on to the stage of investigation, which represents a noticeably sharp rise. In particular, the latest data released in 2015 shows this percentage climbing to an even higher level of 46 percent (Chart 8).

中國企業(yè)是美國濫用國家安全審查的主要受害者之一。美國外國投資委員會成立以來，美國總統(tǒng)根據(jù)該委員會建議否決的4起投資交易均系針對中國企業(yè)或其關聯(lián)企業(yè)。2013－2015年，美國外國投資委員會共審查39個經(jīng)濟體的387起交易，被審查的中國企業(yè)投資交易共74起，占19%，連續(xù)三年位居被審查數(shù)量國別榜首。從近年來美國否決和阻止中國企業(yè)投資的數(shù)據(jù)來看（表4和表5），美國外國投資委員會對華投資審查范圍已從半導體、金融行業(yè)擴大至豬飼養(yǎng)等食品加工業(yè)。加上其審查程序不透明、自由裁量權極大、否決原因披露不詳?shù)纫蛩?，以“危害國家安全”為由阻礙正常交易的情況更為嚴重。
Chinese companies are one of the main targets of the US abuse of national security reviews. Since the establishment of CFIUS, US Presidents vetoed four transactions based on the Committee’s recommendation, all targeting Chinese firms or their related businesses. From 2013 to 2015, CFIUS reviewed in total 387 transactions concerning 39 economies, among which 74 were transactions involving investment from Chinese companies, accounting for 19 percent of the total, the largest share among all countries for three years in a row. The data on Chinese corporate investment being vetoed and blocked by the US (Table 4 and Table 5) shows that CFIUS review of Chinese investment has extended its reach from semiconductors and financial sectors to food processing sectors including swine feed. In addition to an absence of transparency in the review process, excessive discretionary power, and lack of explanations for vetoes, there is an even more serious issue – that normal transactions are being obstructed on the grounds of national security.

美國新立法進一步加強外資安全審查。2018年8月13日，美國總統(tǒng)簽署了《2019財年國防授權法案》，作為其組成部分的《外國投資風險審查現(xiàn)代化法案》賦予了外國投資委員會更大審查權，包括擴大受管轄交易范圍、擴充人員編制、引入“特別關注國”概念、增加考慮審查因素等，投資審查收緊趨勢明顯。其中，特別要求美國商務部在2026年前每兩年提交一份關于中國企業(yè)在美投資情況的分析報告（注40）。
The United States is preparing new legislation for more stringent foreign investment security review. On August 13, 2018, the President signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, part of which is the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), which strengthens the authority of CFIUS, expands the scope of transactions covered, recruits additional staff, establishes the term of “countries of special concern”, and adds additional factors to be considered in reviews. All of this points to a clear trend of tighter investment reviews. In particular, it requests the Department of Commerce to submit a biennial analysis on Chinese investments in the US before 2026. .

（三）提供大量補貼，扭曲市場競爭
3. Large subsidies that distort market competition

美國聯(lián)邦和地方政府對部分產(chǎn)業(yè)和企業(yè)提供大量補貼、救助和優(yōu)惠貸款，這些補貼行為在很大程度上阻礙了市場的公平競爭。根據(jù)美國補貼監(jiān)控組織“好工作優(yōu)先”統(tǒng)計，2000－2015年間，美國聯(lián)邦政府以撥款、稅收抵免等方式至少向企業(yè)補貼了680億美元，其中582家大公司獲得的補貼占總額的67%（注41）。同一時期，美國聯(lián)邦機構向私人部門提供了數(shù)千億美元的貸款、貸款擔保和救助援助。享受美國政府補貼的行業(yè)十分廣泛，在列入統(tǒng)計的49個行業(yè)中，汽車、航空航天和軍工、電氣和電子設備、油氣、金融服務、化工、金屬、零售、信息技術等均在前列（注42）。美國州和地方政府也給予了企業(yè)大量補貼。由于州政府在補貼方面基本不受聯(lián)邦政府的管轄，其補貼方式及金額透明度低，具有較大隱蔽性，實際補貼額遠高于其披露數(shù)額。
US governments at federal and sub-national levels provide large subsidies, bailout assistance, and concessional loans to some sectors and companies. Such actions obstruct, to a large extent, fair market competition. According to Good Jobs First, an American organization that tracks subsidies, between 2000 and 2015, the federal government provided at least US$68 billion in grants and special tax credits to businesses, with 582 large companies receiving 67 percent of the total. During the same period, federal agencies gave the private sector hundreds of billions of dollars in loans, loan guarantees, and bailout assistance. A wide range of sectors received government subsidies. Motor vehicles, aerospace and military contracting, electrical and electronic equipment, oil and gas, financial services, chemicals, metals, and retailing and information technologies ranked among the top of the 49 tracked sectors. State and local governments also gave enormous subsidies to companies. The amounts of subsidies at the state level are basically not subject to federal jurisdiction, hence the difficulty in assessing their specific scale and nature. Actual amounts of the state-level subsidies are much higher than the disclosed figures.

在航空領域，美國波音公司2000年以來獲得聯(lián)邦和州（地方）政府的定向補貼金額145億美元；2011年以來獲得來自各級政府的貸款、債券融資、風險投資、貸款擔保、救助等737億美元（注43）（專欄5）。
In the aviation sector, Boeing has received US$14.5 billion of allocated subsidies from the federal and state/local governments since 2000 and US$73.7 billion of loans, bond financing, venture capital, loan guarantees and bailout assistance from governments at various levels since 2011 (Box 5).

圖表：專欄5 歐盟訴美國民用飛機補貼案 新華社發(fā)

在汽車行業(yè)，美國聯(lián)邦和州政府均有對汽車的扶持政策，并向大型汽車企業(yè)提供巨額救助和變相補貼。國際金融危機期間，美國政府在“不良資產(chǎn)援助計劃”下設立“汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)資助計劃”（AIFP），為大型汽車企業(yè)提供了近800億美元的資金救助（注44）。2007年，美國能源部依據(jù)《2007年能源獨立和安全法案》第136條款制定了“先進技術汽車制造貸款項目”，美國國會對該項目的授權貸款總額達到250億美元（注45）。特斯拉公司自2000年以來得到美國聯(lián)邦和州（地方）政府超過35億美元的補貼（注46）。
In the automotive industry, the US government at both federal and state levels supports the auto industry with preferential policies and provides key auto companies with large bailouts and disguised subsidies. During the global financial crisis, the US government, with its Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP) under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TAPR), provided key auto companies with nearly US$80 billion of assistance. In 2007, the US Department of Energy, citing Section 136 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, introduced the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loan Program (ATVM), with authorization from the US Congress, to provide up to US$25 billion in loans. Since 2000, Tesla has received more than US$3.5 billion in subsidies from US federal and state/local governments.

在計算機和半導體制造領域，美國事實上早就在執(zhí)行由政府引導的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策。上世紀80年代，美國政府對美國半導體制造技術戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟撥款10億美元，以創(chuàng)造具有“超前競爭性”的技術，保持美國技術領先地位，避免過度依賴外國供應商。蘋果公司研發(fā)的幾乎所有產(chǎn)品，包括鼠標、顯示器、操作系統(tǒng)、觸摸屏等，都得到了美國政府部門的支持，甚至有些直接萌芽于政府實驗室。
In the field of computer and semiconductor manufacturing, the US has long adopted government-led industrial policies. The US government allocated US$1 billion in the 1980s to SEMATECH to support cutting-edge research, with a view to maintaining America’s leading position in this area and preventing over-reliance on foreign suppliers. Apple’s research and development on nearly all of its products, including the mouse, the display, the operating system, and the touch screen, received support from US government departments, with some of them created directly in labs run by the government.

在軍工領域，美國對軍工企業(yè)提供了包括稅收優(yōu)惠、貸款擔保、采購承諾等不同形式的支持，對瀕臨破產(chǎn)的大型軍工企業(yè)提供臨時性政府貸款、企業(yè)重組基金、破產(chǎn)保護、過渡基金和債務減免等優(yōu)惠政策?！?014年美國國防生產(chǎn)法案》規(guī)定，“總統(tǒng)可授權擔保機構向私營機構提供貸款擔保，以資助該擔保機構認定的，對建立、維護、擴大、保護或恢復國防所需生產(chǎn)或服務至關重要的任何軍工承包商、分包商、關鍵基礎設施或其他國防生產(chǎn)供應商等”。2016年，全球最大的軍工企業(yè)洛克希德·馬丁公司獲得康涅狄格州2億美元資金支持。
In the military-defense industry, the US has supported related enterprises with preferential taxes, loan guarantees, procurement commitments, etc. Large military-defense enterprises on the brink of bankruptcy have been offered special government loans, restructuring funds, bankruptcy protection, transitional funds, debt relief and other preferential policies. As provided in the 2014 Defense Production Act, “The President may authorize a guaranteeing agency to provide guarantees of loans by private institutions for the purpose of financing any contractor, subcontractor, provider of critical infrastructure, or other person in support of production capabilities or supplies that are deemed by the guaranteeing agency to be necessary to create, maintain, expedite, expand, protect, or restore production and deliveries or services essential to the national defense”. In 2016, Lockheed Martin, the world’s largest military-defense company, obtained US$200 million from the State of Connecticut.

在農(nóng)業(yè)領域，美國長期對農(nóng)業(yè)實施高額財政補貼政策，世界上絕大多數(shù)農(nóng)業(yè)補貼政策均起源于美國。根據(jù)烏拉圭回合談判的結果，美國可在191億美元的補貼上限內(nèi)對各單項產(chǎn)品提供“黃箱”補貼。憑借雄厚的財力和充裕的補貼空間，美國對其大量出口的農(nóng)產(chǎn)品提供了高額補貼。這些補貼影響了世界農(nóng)產(chǎn)品的公平競爭，多次遭到相關國家挑戰(zhàn)，巴西與美國之間歷時12年之久的陸地棉補貼案就是典型代表。2014年，美國對農(nóng)業(yè)補貼政策作出重大調整，以“價格損失保障計劃”和“農(nóng)業(yè)風險保障計劃”替代原有的“反周期支付”等直接補貼計劃，但仍與價格掛鉤，“黃箱”補貼的性質并未變化，而支持水平卻持續(xù)增加。美國農(nóng)業(yè)部前首席經(jīng)濟學家約瑟夫·格勞勃等指出，這兩種保障計劃設定的參考價格均高于過去的目標價格，實際是提高了補貼支持水平（注47）。美國國會研究局的測算表明，兩項保障計劃2015年和2016年支出分別為101億美元和109億美元，而且2016－2017年度支持水平超出了2014年新法案出臺前的水平（注48）。其中，對各單項產(chǎn)品支持的總金額接近150億美元，為近10年的最高水平（注49）。此外，美國還通過各類信用擔保計劃促進農(nóng)產(chǎn)品出口，并通過各類非緊急糧食援助計劃將大量過剩農(nóng)產(chǎn)品轉移到國外，導致了嚴重的商業(yè)替代，對受援國當?shù)剞r(nóng)產(chǎn)品市場造成嚴重干擾，侵害了其他農(nóng)產(chǎn)品出口國的利益。
In agriculture, high subsidies have long been a policy of the US, the birthplace of the majority of agriculture subsidies in the world. As a result of the WTO Uruguay Round negotiations, the US can give all individual items up to US$ 19.1 billion in amber box subsidies. With abundant financial resources and extensive room for subsidies, the US provides high subsidies for its huge agricultural exports. These subsidies undermine fair international competition and have been repeatedly challenged by other countries, a case in point being the 12-year-long dispute with Brazil over the upland cotton subsidy. In 2014, as part of a major adjustment to its agriculture subsidy policy, the US replaced direct subsidy programs, such as the Counter-cyclical Payment, with the Price Loss Coverage Program and the Agricultural Risk Coverage Program. Simply another form of amber box subsidy, these price-pegged subsidies resulted in a higher level of support. Joseph Glauber, the former chief economist of the US Department of Agriculture, pointed out that these two coverage programs, with reference prices set higher than the target prices of the past, in fact raised the level of subsidy support. According to the Congressional Research Service, the two programs together cost US$10.1 billion in 2015 and US$10.9 billion in 2016. The 2016-2017 support level was higher than before the introduction of the act in 2014. A total of nearly US$15 billion was spent in support of individual items, the highest in nearly a decade. The US also boosted its agricultural exports through various forms of credit guarantee programs. On top of that, the US sent a large volume of the excess farm produce abroad as non-emergency food aid, which led to serious problems of commercial substitution, distorting local agricultural markets in the recipient countries, and undermining the interests of other agricultural exporting countries.

（四）使用大量非關稅壁壘
4. Use of large-scale non-tariff barriers

世界貿(mào)易組織并不完全禁止對國內(nèi)產(chǎn)業(yè)實行保護，但原則是削減非關稅壁壘、提升政策措施透明度，使其對貿(mào)易的扭曲減少到最低限度。美國采用大量更具隱蔽性、歧視性和針對性的非關稅壁壘，對國內(nèi)特定市場施以嚴格保護，明顯扭曲了貿(mào)易秩序和市場環(huán)境。
While the WTO does not completely prohibit countries from protecting their domestic industries, certain principles must be followed, including lower non-tariff barriers, greater transparency of policies and measures, and a minimal level of trade distortion. The US has put in place a large number of discriminatory non-tariff barriers that are more targeted yet disguised, in an effort to keep specific segments of the domestic market under strict protection. This approach constitutes a notable distortion of the trade order and market environment.

根據(jù)世界貿(mào)易組織統(tǒng)計，美國當前已通報的衛(wèi)生和植物檢疫以及技術性貿(mào)易壁壘措施分別有3004項和1574項，占全球的比重分別高達18%和6.6%（圖9）。聯(lián)合國貿(mào)發(fā)組織2018年6月29日的報告《對貿(mào)易監(jiān)管數(shù)據(jù)的分析揭露新的重大發(fā)現(xiàn)》（注50）中提到，要把一棵樹進口到美國，需滿足54項衛(wèi)生和植物檢疫措施相關要求。這些措施嚴重影響了貨物通關效率，增加了貿(mào)易成本。
According to the WTO, the US has reported 3,004 sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and 1,574 technical barriers to trade (TBT) measures, accounting for 18 percent and 6.6 percent of the world’s total (Chart 9). As reported in the UNCTAD’s “Analysis of Trade Regulations Data Flags Important New Findings” on June 29, 2018, a tree has to meet 54 SPS requirements before it can be imported into the US. These technical barriers have significantly lowered customs clearance efficiency and raised trade costs.

（五）濫用貿(mào)易救濟措施
5. The abuse of trade remedy measures

根據(jù)世界貿(mào)易組織規(guī)定，成員方在進口產(chǎn)品存在傾銷、補貼或進口過快增長對國內(nèi)產(chǎn)業(yè)造成損害的情況下，可以使用貿(mào)易救濟措施，但有嚴格限定條件。美國大量使用貿(mào)易救濟措施對本國產(chǎn)業(yè)實施保護，其中相當大一部分針對中國。
While the WTO allows the use of trade remedy measures when a member economy finds damage caused to its domestic industries by dumping, subsidy or excessive growth in imports, strict limits and conditions do apply. However, the US has resorted to a huge number of trade remedy measures to protect its domestic industries. Many of these measures target China.

美國貿(mào)易保護主義措施增多，在全球占比不斷提高。全球貿(mào)易預警（Global Trade Alert）統(tǒng)計數(shù)據(jù)顯示，2017年，全球共有837項新的保護主義干預措施，其中美國出臺143項措施，占全球總數(shù)的17.1%。2018年1－7月底，美國出臺的保護主義措施占全球比重達到33%（圖10）。
The US is adopting a growing number of trade protectionist measures, whose share of the world’s total is also rising. According to Global Trade Alert, among the 837 new protectionist measures adopted in 2017 worldwide, 143 (or 17.1 percent) were from the US. From January to the end of July in 2018, the US accounted for 33 percent of all protectionist measures in the world (Chart 10).

美國國際貿(mào)易委員會的統(tǒng)計數(shù)據(jù)顯示，截至2018年7月17日，美國仍在生效的反傾銷和反補貼措施共有44項（圖11），其中58%是2008年金融危機以來新采取的“雙反”措施，主要針對中國、歐盟和日本。
According to the United States International Trade Commission, by July 17, 2018 there were 44 anti-dumping and countervailing measures in effect in the US (Chart 11), among which 58 percent were adopted after the 2008 financial crisis, with China, the EU and Japan as the main targets.

在反傾銷調查中，美國拒不履行《中國加入世貿(mào)組織議定書》第15條約定的義務，繼續(xù)依據(jù)其國內(nèi)法，對中國適用“替代國”做法。根據(jù)美國國會問責局的測算，被認定為市場經(jīng)濟的國家所適用的反傾銷稅率明顯低于非市場經(jīng)濟國家。一般來說，美國對中國的反傾銷稅平均稅率是98%，而對市場經(jīng)濟國家的平均稅率為37%（注51）。2018年以來，美國作出18項涉及中國產(chǎn)品的裁決，其中14項稅率都在100%以上。此外，美國在替代國的選擇上也具有較大隨意性（注52）。中國出口商在美國的傾銷調查中受到嚴重不公正和歧視性對待。
In anti-dumping investigations, the US has refused to honor its obligation under Article 15 of China’s WTO Accession Protocol and continued to use the surrogate-country approach, citing its domestic law. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) of the US Congress calculated that the rates of anti-dumping duties applied to countries recognized as market economies are notably lower than those applied to non-market economies (NMEs). The average anti-dumping duty imposed by the US on China is 98 percent, while that on market economies is 37 percent. Among the 18 US rulings concerning Chinese products since the start of 2018, 14 had rates of more than 100 percent. Moreover, the US picks surrogate countries rather randomly, making the results of anti-dumping investigations highly unfair and discriminatory for Chinese exporters.