四、美國(guó)政府的貿(mào)易霸凌主義行為
IV. The trade bullyism practices of the US administration

美國(guó)作為二戰(zhàn)結(jié)束后國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)秩序和多邊貿(mào)易體制的主要建立者和參與者，本應(yīng)帶頭遵守多邊貿(mào)易規(guī)則，在世界貿(mào)易組織框架下通過(guò)爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制妥善處理與其他成員國(guó)之間的貿(mào)易摩擦，這也是美國(guó)政府曾經(jīng)向國(guó)際社會(huì)作出的明確承諾。但是，美國(guó)新政府上任以來(lái)，片面強(qiáng)調(diào)“美國(guó)優(yōu)先”，奉行單邊主義和經(jīng)濟(jì)霸權(quán)主義，背棄國(guó)際承諾，四面出擊挑起國(guó)際貿(mào)易摩擦，不僅損害了中國(guó)和其他國(guó)家利益，更損害了美國(guó)自身國(guó)際形象，動(dòng)搖了全球多邊貿(mào)易體制根基，最終必將損害美國(guó)長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)利益。
As the key builder of the international economic order and a major participant in the multilateral trading regime after the Second World War, the US should have taken the lead in observing multilateral trade rules and properly handling trade frictions with other WTO members through the dispute settlement system within the WTO framework. This is what the US government explicitly pledged to the international community. However, since taking office, with a narrow focus on “America First”, the new US administration has practiced unilateralism and economic hegemony, abandoned its international commitments, and provoked international trade friction around the world. This has not only undermined the interests of China and other countries, but also jeopardized the international reputation of the US itself. And above all, it has shaken the foundations of the global multilateral trading regime, which will ultimately hurt the long-term interests of the US.

（一）根據(jù)美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)法單方面挑起貿(mào)易摩擦
1. Unilaterally provoking trade friction on the pretext of US domestic law

美國(guó)現(xiàn)任政府以產(chǎn)業(yè)損害和保護(hù)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)為由，繞開(kāi)世界貿(mào)易組織爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制，單純根據(jù)美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)法挑起國(guó)際貿(mào)易摩擦，以“232條款”、“201條款”和“301條款”名義發(fā)起一系列調(diào)查。在調(diào)查中選擇性使用證據(jù)材料，得出武斷結(jié)論，而且未經(jīng)世界貿(mào)易組織授權(quán)，非法使用懲罰性高關(guān)稅對(duì)待世界貿(mào)易組織成員，嚴(yán)重違反世界貿(mào)易組織最基本、最核心的最惠國(guó)待遇、關(guān)稅約束等規(guī)則和紀(jì)律。這種單邊主義行為，不僅損害了中國(guó)和其他成員利益，更損害了世界貿(mào)易組織及其爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制的權(quán)威性，使多邊貿(mào)易體制和國(guó)際貿(mào)易秩序面臨空前險(xiǎn)境。
Citing industrial injuries and protection of intellectual property rights, the current US administration regularly circumvents the WTO’s dispute settlement system and provokes international trade friction merely using US domestic law as a pretext, initiating a host of investigations under the auspices of Section 232, Section 201 and Section 301. These investigations involve selective use of evidence and arbitrary conclusions. Without WTO authorization, the US has illegally imposed punitive, hefty tariffs on other WTO members, which is a serious breach of the most fundamental and central WTO rules and disciplines, including the most-favored-nation treatment and tariff binding. Such unilateralist actions have harmed the interests of China and other WTO members. More importantly, they have undermined the authority of the WTO and its dispute settlement system, and exposed the multilateral trading system and international trade order to unprecedented risks.

對(duì)多國(guó)產(chǎn)品開(kāi)展“232調(diào)查”。美國(guó)政府濫用“國(guó)家安全”概念推行貿(mào)易保護(hù)措施。2017年4月，美國(guó)政府依據(jù)本國(guó)《1962年貿(mào)易擴(kuò)展法》第232條款，以所謂“國(guó)家安全”為由對(duì)包括中國(guó)在內(nèi)的全球主要經(jīng)濟(jì)體的鋼鐵和鋁產(chǎn)品發(fā)起“232調(diào)查”（注53），并依據(jù)單方面調(diào)查結(jié)果，于2018年3月宣布對(duì)進(jìn)口鋼鐵和鋁分別加征25%和10%的關(guān)稅，招致各方普遍反對(duì)和報(bào)復(fù)。2018年4月5日，中國(guó)率先將美國(guó)鋼鋁232措施訴諸世界貿(mào)易組織。美國(guó)宣布自6月1日恢復(fù)對(duì)歐盟鋼鋁產(chǎn)品加征關(guān)稅后，歐盟也予以反擊并向世界貿(mào)易組織申訴，指責(zé)美國(guó)的措施違反世界貿(mào)易組織規(guī)則。歐盟貿(mào)易專員馬姆斯特羅姆稱，美國(guó)正在進(jìn)行“危險(xiǎn)游戲”，歐盟如不作回應(yīng)將等同于接受這些非法關(guān)稅。截至2018年8月，已有9個(gè)世界貿(mào)易組織成員向世界貿(mào)易組織起訴美國(guó)鋼鋁232措施。2018年7月，美國(guó)政府又以所謂“國(guó)家安全”為由，對(duì)進(jìn)口汽車及零配件發(fā)起新的“232調(diào)查”。
The US administration has conducted Section 232 investigations against the products of multiple countries, abusing the concept of “national security” for trade protectionism. In April 2017, on the basis of Section 232 of its Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the US administration initiated Section 232 investigations against the steel and aluminum products of China and other major economies, citing “national security” reasons. In March 2018, based on the conclusions of these unilateral investigations, the US announced 25 percent tariffs on steel and 10 percent on aluminum imports, incurring widespread opposition and retaliation. On April 5, 2018, China took the lead to bring the case of US Section 232 measures against steel and aluminum to the WTO. Following the US announcement on the resumption of tariffs against EU steel and aluminum products effective from June 1, the EU struck back and appealed to the WTO, charging the US with violation of WTO rules. European Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmstr?m said that the US was playing “a dangerous game”, and the EU would be accepting these illegal tariffs if it did not respond. By August 2018, nine WTO members have litigated at the WTO over the Section 232 measures on steel and aluminum. In July 2018, the US administration initiated another round of Section 232 investigations on imported automobiles and auto parts, again on the grounds of “national security”.

眾所周知，鋼、鐵等屬于一般性生產(chǎn)資料，汽車屬大眾消費(fèi)品，與“國(guó)家安全”建立聯(lián)系非常牽強(qiáng)。美國(guó)彼得森國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所高級(jí)研究員查德·鮑恩認(rèn)為，美國(guó)汽車產(chǎn)能利用率超過(guò)了80%，美國(guó)約98%的乘用車進(jìn)口來(lái)自歐盟、日本、加拿大、韓國(guó)和墨西哥，以汽車危及美國(guó)國(guó)家安全為由開(kāi)展調(diào)查是站不住腳的（注54）。美國(guó)政府隨意擴(kuò)大國(guó)家安全概念范圍，毫無(wú)理論和歷史依據(jù)，其實(shí)質(zhì)是利用相關(guān)法條賦予總統(tǒng)行政權(quán)力，繞過(guò)常規(guī)法律限制實(shí)施貿(mào)易保護(hù)（專欄6）。
It is self-evident that steel and iron are basic raw materials for manufacturing, and automobiles are ordinary consumer goods. It is absurd to link them to “national security”. Chad Bown, senior fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, noted that the capacity utilization rate of the US automobile industry was over 80 percent and about 98 percent of US passenger vehicle imports were from the EU, Japan, Canada, the ROK and Mexico. Therefore, initiating the investigations on the ground that automobile imports impair US national security is baseless. The US administration’s arbitrary expansion of the scope of national security has no theoretical or historical logic. Essentially, it is all about using the executive power of the US President provided for by the relevant sections of certain law to circumvent regular legal restrictions to practice trade protectionism (Box 6).

圖表：專欄6 美國(guó)單邊主義行為引發(fā)多國(guó)譴責(zé)和共同反制 新華社發(fā)

對(duì)多國(guó)產(chǎn)品開(kāi)展“201調(diào)查”。2017年5月，美國(guó)依據(jù)本國(guó)《1974年貿(mào)易法》，對(duì)進(jìn)口洗衣機(jī)和光伏產(chǎn)品發(fā)起“201調(diào)查”（注55），并在2018年1月決定對(duì)前者征收為期3年、稅率最高達(dá)50%的關(guān)稅，對(duì)后者征收為期4年、稅率最高達(dá)30%的關(guān)稅。這是2001年以來(lái)美國(guó)首次發(fā)起“201調(diào)查”。作為美國(guó)進(jìn)口洗衣機(jī)的主要來(lái)源，韓國(guó)已于5月向世界貿(mào)易組織提起磋商請(qǐng)求，并宣布將中止對(duì)美國(guó)部分產(chǎn)品的關(guān)稅減讓措施，以回應(yīng)美國(guó)對(duì)韓國(guó)產(chǎn)品征稅的做法。2018年8月14日，中國(guó)將美國(guó)光伏產(chǎn)品201措施訴諸世界貿(mào)易組織爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制。
The US has conducted Section 201 investigations against products of multiple countries. In May 2017, on the basis of its Trade Act of 1974, the US initiated Section 201 investigations on imported washing machines and photovoltaic products. In January 2018, it decided to impose a maximum of 50 percent tariffs for three years on washing machines and a maximum of 30 percent tariffs for four years on photovoltaic products. These were the first Section 201 investigations initiated by the US since 2001. As a major source of washing machines imports to the US, the ROK submitted a request for consultations to the WTO in May and announced that it would suspend tariff concessions on some US products as a response to the US imposition of tariffs on its products. On August 14, 2018, China resorted to the WTO dispute settlement system over the Section 201 measures on photovoltaic products.

對(duì)中國(guó)開(kāi)展“301調(diào)查”。2017年8月，美國(guó)依據(jù)本國(guó)《1974年貿(mào)易法》，對(duì)中國(guó)發(fā)起“301調(diào)查”（注56），并在2018年7月和8月分兩批對(duì)從中國(guó)進(jìn)口的500億美元商品加征25%關(guān)稅，此后還不斷升級(jí)關(guān)稅措施，2018年9月24日起，又對(duì)2000億中國(guó)輸美產(chǎn)品征收10%的關(guān)稅。“301調(diào)查”是基于美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)法相關(guān)條款開(kāi)展的貿(mào)易調(diào)查，衡量并要求其他國(guó)家接受美國(guó)的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和市場(chǎng)準(zhǔn)入要求，否則就采取報(bào)復(fù)性的貿(mào)易制裁手段，早在上世紀(jì)90年代就被稱為“激進(jìn)的單邊主義”。
The US has initiated Section 301 investigation against China. In August 2017, the US initiated a Section 301 investigation against China based on its Trade Act of 1974. A 25 percent tariff was imposed on US$50 billion worth of goods from China in July and August 2018, followed by a continuation of escalating tariff measures. Another tariff of 10 percent on a further US$200 billion worth of China’s exports to the US was imposed from September 24, 2018. A Section 301 investigation is a trade investigation based on relevant provisions of US domestic law. It requests other countries to accept the intellectual property standards and market access requirements of the US, or face retaliatory trade sanctions. Such practice was described as “aggressive unilateralism” as early as in the 1990s.

從歷史數(shù)據(jù)看，“301調(diào)查”使用頻率較低且多通過(guò)磋商協(xié)議解決。根據(jù)彼得森國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所2018年3月發(fā)布的研究報(bào)告（注57），1974年至今，美國(guó)共進(jìn)行122起“301調(diào)查”，但自2001年起，只有一起“301調(diào)查”被正式啟動(dòng)。美國(guó)政府曾于1994年做出一項(xiàng)“行政行動(dòng)聲明”，表示要按照符合世界貿(mào)易組織規(guī)則的方式來(lái)執(zhí)行“301條款”，即美國(guó)只有在獲得世界貿(mào)易組織爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制授權(quán)后才能實(shí)施“301條款”所規(guī)定的制裁措施。1998年，當(dāng)時(shí)的歐共體向世界貿(mào)易組織提出關(guān)于“301條款”的爭(zhēng)端解決案。世界貿(mào)易組織爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)構(gòu)認(rèn)為，單從其法律規(guī)定上看，可以初步認(rèn)定“301條款”不符合世界貿(mào)易組織規(guī)定。在本次中美經(jīng)貿(mào)摩擦中，美國(guó)政府動(dòng)用“301條款”對(duì)中國(guó)開(kāi)展調(diào)查，在未經(jīng)世界貿(mào)易組織授權(quán)的情況下對(duì)中國(guó)產(chǎn)品大規(guī)模加征關(guān)稅，明顯違反美國(guó)政府的上述承諾，其行為是完全非法的。
Historical data show that it is very rare for a Section 301 investigation to be initiated – most cases are settled through consultation. According to a report from the Peterson Institute for International Economics released in March 2018, from 1974 to the present, the US government has conducted 122 such Section 301 investigations, but there has been only one new Section 301 investigation since 2001. In 1994, the US government issued a “Statement of Administrative Action”, stating that the Administration intends to use Section 301 under the WTO rules, and that it would only impose sanctions under Section 301 with authorization from the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). In 1998, the European Communities filed a case to the WTO DSB against Section 301, and the Panel came to a preliminary finding that in respect of the statutory language, Section 301 is inconsistent with WTO rules. The US government has initiated a Section 301 investigation in the course of its current trade frictions with China, and imposed huge tariffs on Chinese goods in the absence of WTO authorization. These actions have clearly violated its afore-mentioned commitments, and are completely illegal.

（二）片面指責(zé)他國(guó)實(shí)施產(chǎn)業(yè)政策
2. Baseless accusations against other countries’ industrial policies

產(chǎn)業(yè)政策是一種彌補(bǔ)市場(chǎng)失靈、改善社會(huì)福利的有效工具，只要符合世界貿(mào)易組織確定的規(guī)則，不應(yīng)受到無(wú)端指責(zé)。
As an effective tool to remedy market failures and improve social welfare, industrial policies should not be subject to groundless accusations as long as they are consistent with WTO rules.

美國(guó)是世界上較早運(yùn)用產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的國(guó)家之一。盡管美國(guó)很少承認(rèn)實(shí)行產(chǎn)業(yè)政策，但事實(shí)上美國(guó)政府實(shí)施了比官方說(shuō)法多得多的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策（注58）。這些產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的范疇從推進(jìn)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新到政府采購(gòu)、對(duì)特定部門(mén)和企業(yè)的補(bǔ)貼，以及關(guān)稅保護(hù)、貿(mào)易協(xié)定等，為增強(qiáng)美國(guó)產(chǎn)業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力發(fā)揮了重要作用。
The US was among the first to adopt industrial policies. The US rarely acknowledges the adoption of such policies, but its government has in fact undertaken many more industrial policies than the official narrative allows. Ranging from technological innovation incentives and government procurement, through subsidies on specific sectors and companies, to tariff protection and trade agreements, these industrial policies have played a vital role in enhancing the competitive strength of US industries.

美國(guó)為強(qiáng)化制造業(yè)在全球的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者地位，近年來(lái)研究制定了一大批產(chǎn)業(yè)政策。進(jìn)入新世紀(jì)后，特別是國(guó)際金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)后的近十年來(lái)，美國(guó)出臺(tái)了一系列產(chǎn)業(yè)政策，其中包括《重振美國(guó)制造業(yè)框架》（注59）（2009）、《美國(guó)制造業(yè)促進(jìn)法案》（注60）（2010）、《先進(jìn)制造業(yè)伙伴計(jì)劃》（注61）（2011）、《美國(guó)制造業(yè)復(fù)興——促進(jìn)增長(zhǎng)的4大目標(biāo)》（注62）（2011）、《先進(jìn)制造業(yè)國(guó)家戰(zhàn)略計(jì)劃》（注63）（2012）、《美國(guó)創(chuàng)新戰(zhàn)略》（注64）（2011）、《美國(guó)制造業(yè)創(chuàng)新網(wǎng)絡(luò)：初步設(shè)計(jì)》（注65）（2013）等等，針對(duì)重點(diǎn)領(lǐng)域研究制定了《電網(wǎng)現(xiàn)代化計(jì)劃》（2011）、《美國(guó)清潔能源制造計(jì)劃》（注66）（2013）、《從互聯(lián)網(wǎng)到機(jī)器人——美國(guó)機(jī)器人路線圖》（注67）（2013）、《金屬增材制造（3D打?。┘夹g(shù)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)路線圖》（注68）（2013）、《美國(guó)人工智能研究與發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略計(jì)劃》（注69）（2016）、《美國(guó)機(jī)器智能國(guó)家戰(zhàn)略》（注70）（2018）等。這些政策提出要調(diào)整優(yōu)化政府投資，加大對(duì)制造業(yè)投資的力度；加強(qiáng)政府對(duì)商品的采購(gòu)；為出口企業(yè)提供信貸支持，拓展國(guó)際市場(chǎng)；資助制造業(yè)重點(diǎn)領(lǐng)域創(chuàng)新等具體措施。
To strengthen its global leadership in manufacturing, the US has in recent years formulated a large number of industrial policies. In the 21st century, and in particular over the decade since the outbreak of the international financial crisis, the US has introduced a number of industrial policies including A Framework for Revitalizing American Manufacturing (2009), the United States Manufacturing Enhancement Act of 2010, the Advanced Manufacturing Partnership (2011), A Manufacturing Renaissance: Four Goals for Economic Growth (2011), A National Strategic Plan for Advanced Manufacturing (2012), A Strategy for American Innovation (2011) and the National Network of Manufacturing Innovation: A Preliminary Design (2013). Such plans are also made for key areas such as the Grid Modernization Initiative (2011), the Clean Energy Manufacturing Initiative (2013), A Roadmap for U.S. Robotics – From Internet to Robotics (2013), the Measurement Science Roadmap for Metal-Based Additive Manufacturing (2013), the National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan (2016) and A National Machine Intelligence Strategy for the United States (2018). These policies include, among others, specific measures to adjust and improve government investment to scale up input in manufacturing, to increase government procurement of certain products, to provide credit support to export companies to expand global market, and to fund innovation in key areas of manufacturing.

美國(guó)在制定推行產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的同時(shí)，卻對(duì)他國(guó)正常的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策橫加責(zé)難。聯(lián)合國(guó)貿(mào)易和發(fā)展會(huì)議發(fā)布的《世界投資報(bào)告2018》指出，為應(yīng)對(duì)新工業(yè)革命的機(jī)遇與挑戰(zhàn)，在過(guò)去十年中，發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家和發(fā)展中國(guó)家至少有101個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體（占全球GDP的90%以上）出臺(tái)了正式的產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略?！吨袊?guó)制造2025》也是在這樣的背景下，借鑒了美國(guó)的《先進(jìn)制造業(yè)國(guó)家戰(zhàn)略計(jì)劃》、《美國(guó)創(chuàng)新戰(zhàn)略》等政策文件，結(jié)合中國(guó)實(shí)際制定出臺(tái)的?！吨袊?guó)制造2025》是一個(gè)引導(dǎo)性、愿景性的文件，也是一個(gè)堅(jiān)持市場(chǎng)主導(dǎo)、開(kāi)放包容的發(fā)展規(guī)劃。中國(guó)政府一直強(qiáng)調(diào)《中國(guó)制造2025》是一個(gè)開(kāi)放的體系，對(duì)內(nèi)資外資具有普遍適用性。中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人在多個(gè)場(chǎng)合表示，歡迎外國(guó)企業(yè)參與《中國(guó)制造2025》。2017年發(fā)布的《國(guó)務(wù)院關(guān)于擴(kuò)大對(duì)外開(kāi)放積極利用外資若干措施的通知》明確提出，外商投資企業(yè)和內(nèi)資企業(yè)同等適用于《中國(guó)制造2025》政策。文件制定過(guò)程中，中國(guó)嚴(yán)格遵循世界貿(mào)易組織規(guī)定，確保相關(guān)政策合規(guī)透明、公平無(wú)歧視。《中國(guó)制造2025》實(shí)施以來(lái)，包括美國(guó)企業(yè)在內(nèi)的許多外國(guó)企業(yè)均已參與到相關(guān)的建設(shè)項(xiàng)目中來(lái)。
While formulating and promoting its own industrial policies, the US has made unwarranted accusations against other countries’ justified industrial policies. The UNCTAD World Investment Report 2018 pointed out that responding to the opportunities and challenges associated with a new industrial revolution, at least 101 economies across the developed and developing world (accounting for more than 90 percent of global GDP) have adopted formal industrial development strategies over the past 10 years. It was against this backdrop, inspired by US policy papers such as A National Strategic Plan for Advanced Manufacturing and A Strategy for American Innovation, and based on its own national conditions, that China formulated its Made in China 2025 program. Made in China 2025 is an introductory paper describing a vision, and a market-centered, open and inclusive blueprint for development. The Chinese government has maintained that Made in China 2025 is an open system that is applicable to both domestic and foreign investment. Chinese leaders have stated on several occasions that China welcomes foreign companies to participate in Made in China 2025. China’s State Council released a notice in 2017 on measures to expand opening up and actively utilize foreign investment, which made clear that Made in China 2025 policies apply equally to foreign-invested companies and Chinese companies. The paper was formulated in strict accordance with WTO rules to ensure the relevant policies are legitimate, transparent, fair and non-discriminatory in nature. Many foreign enterprises, including US companies, have participated in programs under Made in China 2025 since its implementation.

（三）以國(guó)內(nèi)法“長(zhǎng)臂管轄”制裁他國(guó)
3. “Long-arm jurisdiction” and sanctions against other countries based on US domestic laws

“長(zhǎng)臂管轄”是指依托國(guó)內(nèi)法規(guī)的觸角延伸到境外，管轄境外實(shí)體的做法。近年來(lái)，美國(guó)不斷擴(kuò)充“長(zhǎng)臂管轄”的范圍，涵蓋了民事侵權(quán)、金融投資、反壟斷、出口管制、網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全等眾多領(lǐng)域，并在國(guó)際事務(wù)中動(dòng)輒要求其他國(guó)家的實(shí)體或個(gè)人必須服從美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)法，否則隨時(shí)可能遭到美國(guó)的民事、刑事、貿(mào)易等制裁。
“Long-arm jurisdiction” refers to the practice of extending one’s tentacles beyond one’s borders and exercising jurisdiction over foreign entities based on one’s domestic laws. In recent years, the US has been extending its “l(fā)ong-arm jurisdiction” to wider areas including civil torts, financial investment, anti-monopoly, export control and cybersecurity. In international affairs, the US has frequently requested entities or individuals of other countries to obey US domestic laws, otherwise they may face US civil, criminal or trade sanctions at any time.

以出口管制為例，美國(guó)為鞏固技術(shù)領(lǐng)先優(yōu)勢(shì)，很早就構(gòu)建起一攬子出口管制制度。主要依據(jù)《出口管理法》、《出口管制條例》、《國(guó)際緊急經(jīng)濟(jì)權(quán)力法》，要求美國(guó)出口商或用戶出口時(shí)必須申請(qǐng)?jiān)S可證。對(duì)于國(guó)外購(gòu)買(mǎi)方而言，則要求不得違反商品最終用途、最終用戶等限制性規(guī)定，否則將受到處罰，包括被列入“實(shí)體清單”，嚴(yán)格限制或禁止從美國(guó)進(jìn)口。統(tǒng)計(jì)顯示，截至2018年8月1日，全球范圍內(nèi)被列入美國(guó)商務(wù)部“實(shí)體清單”的主體數(shù)量達(dá)到1013家。這種行為不僅損害了包括美國(guó)公司在內(nèi)的相關(guān)企業(yè)利益，還損害了廣大發(fā)展中國(guó)家發(fā)展權(quán)利。
Take export control as an example. To consolidate its technological advantages, the US has long established an all-round export control system. Through the Export Control Act, the Export Administration Regulations and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, US exporters or exporting users must apply for export licenses. Foreign buyers are required not to violate restrictive regulations such as those on end-use and end-users, otherwise they will be subject to penalties, including being put in the Entity List which will place them under strict restrictions, or even prohibit them from importing from the US. Statistics show that by August 1, 2018, as many as 1,013 entities from around the world have been put on the Entity List of the US Department of Commerce. This action has undermined not only the interests of companies concerned – including those from the US – but also the development rights of developing countries.

美國(guó)還在抓緊審查修訂現(xiàn)行出口管制法規(guī)，強(qiáng)化“長(zhǎng)臂管轄”行為。2018年8月13日，美國(guó)總統(tǒng)簽署了《2019財(cái)年國(guó)防授權(quán)法案》，作為其重要組成部分的《出口管制改革法案》提高了對(duì)外國(guó)控股公司的限制條件，增加了對(duì)“新興和基礎(chǔ)技術(shù)”的出口控制，建立了跨部門(mén)協(xié)商機(jī)制以提高執(zhí)法能力。近期，美國(guó)商務(wù)部產(chǎn)業(yè)和安全局以“違反美國(guó)國(guó)家安全或外交政策利益”為由，將44個(gè)中國(guó)機(jī)構(gòu)新列入出口管制名單。這種行為給中國(guó)企業(yè)參與相關(guān)貿(mào)易制造了障礙，實(shí)質(zhì)是對(duì)“長(zhǎng)臂管轄”強(qiáng)化和升級(jí)。
The US is also vigorously reviewing and revising its export control legislation to strengthen its “l(fā)ong-arm jurisdiction”. On August 13, 2018, the US President signed the National Defense Authorization Act 2019, an important part of which is the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA). The ECRA further tightened restrictions on foreign-holding companies, intensified controls on “emerging and basic technologies”, and mandated an inter-agency process to boost law enforcement capabilities. Recently, the Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce added 44 Chinese entities to its Entity List for “acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States”. Such measures create obstacles for Chinese businesses to conduct normal trade and are in fact an extension and upgrading of “l(fā)ong-arm jurisdiction”.

（四）將國(guó)內(nèi)問(wèn)題國(guó)際化、經(jīng)貿(mào)問(wèn)題政治化
4. Internationalizing domestic issues and politicizing economic and trade issues

現(xiàn)任美國(guó)政府基于國(guó)內(nèi)政治需要，將國(guó)內(nèi)問(wèn)題國(guó)際化、經(jīng)貿(mào)問(wèn)題政治化，通過(guò)指責(zé)他國(guó)轉(zhuǎn)嫁國(guó)內(nèi)矛盾。
The current US administration, in response to domestic political issues, is choosing to internationalize domestic issues and politicize economic and trade issues, and blaming other countries for its own problems.

美國(guó)將國(guó)內(nèi)政策失誤和制度缺陷導(dǎo)致的失業(yè)問(wèn)題錯(cuò)誤歸因于國(guó)際貿(mào)易。美國(guó)政府認(rèn)為他國(guó)通過(guò)不公平貿(mào)易的方式搶奪了本國(guó)就業(yè)崗位，作為美國(guó)貿(mào)易逆差最大來(lái)源國(guó)，中國(guó)首當(dāng)其沖成為主要的被指責(zé)對(duì)象。事實(shí)是，根據(jù)聯(lián)合國(guó)數(shù)據(jù)，2001－2017年，中美貿(mào)易額增長(zhǎng)了4.4倍，但美國(guó)失業(yè)率則從5.7%下降到4.1%。尤其是2009年以來(lái)，美國(guó)從中國(guó)進(jìn)口快速增長(zhǎng)，同期美國(guó)失業(yè)率反而呈現(xiàn)出持續(xù)下降的態(tài)勢(shì)，美國(guó)政府指責(zé)的貨物進(jìn)口和失業(yè)率之間的替代關(guān)系并不存在（圖12）。2017年美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)研究中心報(bào)告顯示，2010－2015年，盡管美國(guó)制造業(yè)從中國(guó)進(jìn)口整體增加32.4%，美國(guó)制造業(yè)的工作機(jī)會(huì)反而增加了6.8%（注71）。
It has erroneously attributed unemployment caused by domestic policy and institutional flaws to international trade. The US administration has accused other countries of “stealing US jobs through unfair trade”. China, as the biggest source of the US trade deficit, is a convenient primary target. However, statistics from the United Nations show that between 2001 and 2017, China-US trade expanded by a factor of 4.4, and yet unemployment in the US dropped from 5.7 percent to 4.1 percent. In particular, while US imports from China surged from 2009 onward, unemployment in the US saw a steady decline during the same period. The causal relationship between imports of goods and job losses, as claimed by the US administration, does not exist (see Chart 12). A report from the US Congressional Research Service in 2017 reveals that between 2010 and 2015, the number of US manufacturing jobs rose by 6.8 percent even though US imports from China in that sector increased by 32.4 percent.

事實(shí)上，美國(guó)部分社會(huì)群體失業(yè)問(wèn)題，主要是技術(shù)進(jìn)步和經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整背景下，國(guó)內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)政策失誤和再分配、再就業(yè)機(jī)制缺失引起的。根據(jù)美國(guó)印第安納州波爾州立大學(xué)的研究，2000－2010年期間，美國(guó)制造業(yè)工作機(jī)會(huì)減少560萬(wàn)個(gè)，88%是由于生產(chǎn)率提高導(dǎo)致的（注72）。在市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)條件下，一切要素都在流動(dòng)變化之中，沒(méi)有永遠(yuǎn)不變的工作崗位。隨著美國(guó)比較優(yōu)勢(shì)變化，不同行業(yè)就業(yè)情況出現(xiàn)差異，傳統(tǒng)制造業(yè)等行業(yè)出現(xiàn)就業(yè)崗位減少，這本是經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展和結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整的正?，F(xiàn)象。美國(guó)政府本應(yīng)順應(yīng)經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整大趨勢(shì)，采取積極有效的再分配和再就業(yè)支持措施，幫助失業(yè)人員轉(zhuǎn)移到新興行業(yè)就業(yè)。但是，受制于傳統(tǒng)的分配機(jī)制和利益格局，美國(guó)政府沒(méi)有及時(shí)建立合理的再分配和再就業(yè)支持機(jī)制，導(dǎo)致部分社會(huì)群體的失業(yè)問(wèn)題長(zhǎng)期積累、積重難返，為政治上的民粹主義和孤立主義提供了土壤。
In fact, unemployment of some social groups in the US is caused by flaws in domestic economic policy and the absence of proper redistribution and reemployment mechanisms against the backdrop of technological advances and economic restructuring. A study by Ball State University in the State of Indiana finds out that almost 88 percent of the 5.6 million jobs lost in manufacturing in the US between 2000 and 2010 can be attributed to productivity growth. In a market economy where all production factors are in flux, no job lasts forever. The evolution of comparative advantages of the US has had different impacts on job creation in different industries. Decrease of jobs in some industries such as traditional manufacturing is a normal phenomenon in the course of economic development and structural adjustment. The US government should have adapted to the overall trend of economic structural adjustment, taking proactive and effective measures to improve redistribution and reemployment and to help the unemployed find jobs in emerging industries. However, constrained by its traditional distribution mechanism and vested interests, the US government has failed to establish appropriate redistribution and reemployment mechanisms in time. The result has been the build-up of long-standing unemployment among some social groups. This has provided the breeding ground for political populism and isolationism.

現(xiàn)任美國(guó)政府把失業(yè)問(wèn)題歸咎于國(guó)際貿(mào)易和出口國(guó)不符合事實(shí)，是在國(guó)內(nèi)政治矛盾難以解決的情況下試圖向外轉(zhuǎn)嫁矛盾。美國(guó)如不真正解決自身的深層次結(jié)構(gòu)性問(wèn)題，而是通過(guò)貿(mào)易保護(hù)措施引導(dǎo)制造業(yè)回流，這種本末倒置、以鄰為壑、逆經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)律而動(dòng)的行為，只會(huì)降低全球經(jīng)濟(jì)效率，引發(fā)世界各國(guó)反對(duì)，損人而不利己。
The current US administration’s attempt to blame international trade and exporting countries for domestic unemployment is not supported by facts; it aims to deflect public attention in the face of intractable domestic political problems. Without truly resolving its own deep-seated structural problems, the US attempt to bring the manufacturing sector back home through protectionist measures is a completely counter-productive move. This beggar-thy-neighbor and lose-lose approach runs counter to economic rules and will only make the world economy less efficient and trigger opposition from countries around the globe. The US will do as much damage to itself as it will to others.

（五）現(xiàn)任美國(guó)政府背信棄義
5. The current US administration is violating its own commitments

規(guī)則意識(shí)和契約精神是市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)和現(xiàn)代國(guó)際秩序的基礎(chǔ)。遵守規(guī)則、尊重契約使得不同個(gè)人、群體和國(guó)家可以形成廣泛合作，是人類進(jìn)入文明社會(huì)的主要特征?，F(xiàn)任美國(guó)政府不顧各國(guó)公認(rèn)、普遍遵循的國(guó)際交往準(zhǔn)則，采取了一系列背信棄義的做法，對(duì)國(guó)際關(guān)系采取機(jī)會(huì)主義態(tài)度，引發(fā)國(guó)際社會(huì)廣泛質(zhì)疑和批評(píng)。美國(guó)這些急功近利的短視做法，損害了美國(guó)的國(guó)際信譽(yù)，將動(dòng)搖美國(guó)國(guó)際地位和戰(zhàn)略利益。
Respect for rules and contract has been the foundation of the market economy and the international order since the advent of modern times. It makes cooperation between different individuals, groups and countries possible, which is a defining feature of civilized human society. The current US administration has turned its back on universally-recognized and widely-observed norms governing international relations, and made a series of moves in violation of its own commitments. The opportunism of the US toward international relations has been widely challenged and criticized by the international community. The short-sighted actions of the US in pursuit of short-term interests harm its international credibility, and will undermine its international standing and prejudice its strategic interests.

美國(guó)政府藐視國(guó)際協(xié)定的權(quán)威性，擾亂全球治理秩序。以國(guó)家名義做出的承諾和簽署的協(xié)定不受政府換屆干擾，保持一貫性，是一國(guó)保持國(guó)際信譽(yù)的基礎(chǔ)?，F(xiàn)任美國(guó)政府夸大多邊體制問(wèn)題和國(guó)家之間的分歧，不愿承擔(dān)維護(hù)國(guó)際秩序成本，對(duì)國(guó)際規(guī)則約束進(jìn)行選擇性遵守，接連退出聯(lián)合國(guó)教科文組織、人權(quán)理事會(huì)等多個(gè)國(guó)際組織，退出了上屆美國(guó)政府力推達(dá)成的跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定和巴黎氣候協(xié)定，強(qiáng)制要求重談北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定和美韓自貿(mào)協(xié)定。
The US administration shows no respect for the sanctity of international agreements and disrupts global governance order. A country should uphold the commitments and agreements it has entered into regardless of government succession. This is essential for a country’s credibility. Exaggerating problems in the multilateral system and differences between countries, the current US administration, unwilling to bear the cost of upholding the international order, has taken a selective approach to international rules. It has withdrawn from international organizations such as UNESCO and the UNHRC, pulled out from the TPP and the Paris Agreement that the previous US administration worked so hard to conclude, and is demanding renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and US-Korea Free Trade Agreement.

以聯(lián)合國(guó)、世界銀行、國(guó)際貨幣基金組織和關(guān)貿(mào)總協(xié)定為起點(diǎn)，經(jīng)過(guò)不斷完善，形成了今天的全球政治經(jīng)濟(jì)治理體系。世界貿(mào)易組織是當(dāng)前重要的多邊經(jīng)貿(mào)機(jī)制，在國(guó)際經(jīng)貿(mào)合作中發(fā)揮著關(guān)鍵作用，在世界上受到普遍尊重和認(rèn)同，目前成員已超過(guò)160個(gè)。但是，美國(guó)經(jīng)常違反世界貿(mào)易組織規(guī)則，1995－2015年期間，因美國(guó)未執(zhí)行世界貿(mào)易組織爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制裁定而被勝訴方提出暫停申請(qǐng)、中止對(duì)美國(guó)關(guān)稅減讓義務(wù)的案件數(shù)量占到世界貿(mào)易組織同類案件總數(shù)量的2/3（注73）。
The global political and economic governance system has only become what it is through constant improvements, starting from the inception of the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO is an important multilateral trading regime with a total of over 160 members. It is essential to global trade cooperation, and is widely respected and recognized in the world. However, the US frequently violates WTO rules. The number of cases where members requested a suspension of the application of tariff concessions, or suspended tariff concession obligations to the US due to the latter’s failure to comply with the rulings of the DSB, accounted for two thirds of all such cases between 1995 and 2015.

這一系列行為，是對(duì)國(guó)際契約的違背，是對(duì)經(jīng)貿(mào)伙伴的不尊重，更是對(duì)美國(guó)國(guó)家信譽(yù)的損害。世界經(jīng)濟(jì)論壇發(fā)布的《2018年全球風(fēng)險(xiǎn)報(bào)告》指出，美國(guó)對(duì)多邊主義秩序造成的侵害，以及美國(guó)阻撓世界貿(mào)易組織上訴機(jī)構(gòu)新法官任命，將加劇2018年的全球風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
These actions of the US violate international contracts and disrespect its trading partners, and what is more, undermine its credibility as a country. The “Global Risks Report 2018” released by the World Economic Forum pointed out that global risks will intensify in 2018, as the US erodes multilateralism and blocks appointments to the WTO’s appellate body.

美國(guó)政府破壞市場(chǎng)機(jī)制，直接干預(yù)商業(yè)行為。現(xiàn)任美國(guó)政府屢屢突破政府邊界，對(duì)市場(chǎng)主體實(shí)施直接干預(yù)。例如，不顧商業(yè)規(guī)律，要求蘋(píng)果公司等美國(guó)企業(yè)海外工廠回遷。此外，美國(guó)政府還對(duì)美國(guó)企業(yè)對(duì)外投資進(jìn)行恐嚇阻撓。例如，2017年1月3日，警告通用汽車，如果它繼續(xù)在墨西哥制造雪佛蘭科魯茲型號(hào)汽車的話，將需要支付大額關(guān)稅（注74）；2018年7月3日，威脅哈雷公司不得將生產(chǎn)業(yè)務(wù)轉(zhuǎn)移出美國(guó)（注75）；通過(guò)社交媒體點(diǎn)名批評(píng)威脅企業(yè)高管，以各種借口加強(qiáng)對(duì)正常并購(gòu)交易的審查等。
The US administration has undermined the market mechanism through direct intervention in business operations. The current US administration has time and again overstepped its purview to directly meddle with market players. For instance, it has demanded that Apple and some other American companies move their overseas factories back to the US, regardless of market rules. The administration has also intimidated and obstructed American companies making investments abroad. For instance, on January 3, 2017, General Motors was threatened with a heavy border tax for continuing to make Chevrolet Cruze models in Mexico. On July 3, 2018, Harley-Davidson was warned not to move part of its operation out of the US. Executives of American companies have been named and shamed on social media, as the administration tightens supervision over normal merger deals under various pretexts.

美國(guó)政府在雙邊經(jīng)貿(mào)談判中出爾反爾，不守承諾。中國(guó)歷來(lái)高度重視維護(hù)中美關(guān)系穩(wěn)定，特別是2017年以來(lái)，積極回應(yīng)美國(guó)經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)切，以極大的誠(chéng)意和耐心與美國(guó)政府開(kāi)展了多輪磋商，力圖彌合分歧、解決問(wèn)題。2018年2月下旬到3月上旬，應(yīng)美國(guó)方面強(qiáng)烈要求，中國(guó)派團(tuán)赴美舉行經(jīng)貿(mào)談判。4月3日，美國(guó)公布對(duì)500億美元中國(guó)輸美產(chǎn)品加征25%關(guān)稅的產(chǎn)品清單。面對(duì)美國(guó)反復(fù)無(wú)常、不斷抬高要價(jià)的行為，中國(guó)本著最大限度通過(guò)對(duì)話解決問(wèn)題的誠(chéng)意，于5月初與來(lái)華談判的美國(guó)代表進(jìn)行了認(rèn)真磋商。5月15日至19日，中國(guó)應(yīng)美國(guó)要求再次派代表團(tuán)赴美談判，并在談判中對(duì)美國(guó)訴求做了積極回應(yīng)。雙方在付出艱辛努力后，達(dá)成“雙方不打貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)”的共識(shí)，并于5月19日對(duì)外發(fā)表了聯(lián)合聲明。但是，僅僅10天之后，美國(guó)政府就公然撕毀雙方剛剛達(dá)成的聯(lián)合聲明，背棄不打貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的承諾，越過(guò)世界貿(mào)易組織爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制，宣布將對(duì)來(lái)自中國(guó)的產(chǎn)品實(shí)施大規(guī)模征稅措施，單方面挑起貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)（專欄7）。
The US administration has repeatedly backtracked and reneged on its commitments in bilateral trade negotiations. China sets great store by a stable China-US relationship. It has actively responded to the trade concerns of the US, especially since 2017. Multiple rounds of talks have been conducted with the US administration with utmost sincerity and patience, in an effort to narrow differences and solve problems. In response to a strong request from the US, China sent a delegation to the US for trade talks between late February and early March 2018. Yet on April 3, the US announced a 25 percent tariff on a list of Chinese exports worth US$50 billion. Despite this repeated backtracking and in the face of rising demands from the US, China has demonstrated complete sincerity in seeking a negotiated solution, and sat down for earnest consultations with a visiting US delegation in early May. At the US request, China sent another delegation to the US which actively responded to the US concerns in negotiations between 15 and 19 of May. Thanks to the strenuous efforts of both sides, a consensus was reached “not to fight a trade war”, and a joint statement was released on May 19. However, only 10 days later, the US administration tore up the freshly inked joint statement and broke its promise not to engage in a trade war. It bypassed the dispute settlement system of the WTO to announce massive tariffs on Chinese exports, thus unilaterally starting a new phase of conflict (Box 7).

圖表：專欄7 美方撕毀2018年5月19日中美經(jīng)貿(mào)磋商聯(lián)合聲明 新華社發(fā)